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Abstract 
 
It is often suggested in the case of mixed-member electoral systems that legislators with close 
ties to the Single Member Districts (SMD) are more constituency-oriented than those with 
weaker ties. This article investigates the effect of three career-related variables (mandate type, 
tier of candidacy and the number of formerly held SMD mandates) on the constituency 
orientation of national representatives. The analysis relies on a comprehensive database 
containing MP-level career information and the number of locally relevant written questions 
submitted between 2010 and 2013 in the Hungarian parliament. Contrary to the expectations, 
the results suggest that SMD candidates who were elected on party lists tend to ask a larger 
number of questions with local relevance than SMD MPs. Furthermore, MPs with 
considerable SMD experience are found to be more constituency-oriented only among those 
who gained their mandates in an SMD. 
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Introduction 
The link between electoral systems and service responsiveness is an extensively studied area 
of legislative studies. The main question is whether representatives elected under different 
electoral rules perceive their connection to their voters in different ways. Students of 
legislator behaviour have found a strong connection between the rules of election and 
representational attitudes (Heitshusen, Young, & Wood, 2005; Pilet, Freire, & Costa, 2012), 
constituency work (Lundberg, 2006), pork barrel politics (Lancaster, 1986; Stratmann & 
Baur, 2002), campaign strategies (Zittel & Gschwend, 2008), legislative (Bräuninger, 
Brunner, & Däubler, 2012; Herron, 2002) and non-legislative parliamentary activities 
(Manow, 2013). This article investigates how the different characteristics of mixed-member 
electoral rules affect non-legislative parliamentary activities. This is tested on the number of 
locally oriented written questions in the Hungarian Parliament. 
Mixed-member electoral rules produce various types of MPs who are likely to perceive 
local representation in different ways. First, due to the mixed-member system, at least two 
types of representatives are elected. While first tier MPs come from Single Member Districts 
(SMDs), list tier MPs gain their seats through party lists. Several scholars have shown that 
SMD MPs are likely to be more constituency-oriented than list MPs (Lundberg, 2006; 
Stratmann & Baur, 2002; Zittel & Gschwend, 2008). Second, in a mixed system that also 
allows candidates to be nominated on multiple tiers simultaneously (i.e. the same candidate 
can be nominated both in an SMD and in a party list), not only the type of mandate affects 
strategic choices of constituency-orientation but also the different paths into parliament. The 
difference between SMD and list candidates is expected to manifest in differences in their 
constituency-related activities (Manow, 2013). Furthermore, members may also differ in 
terms of their experiences as legislators. MPs with more SMD experience might perceive the 
utility of establishing constituency ties differently than representatives who always gained 
their mandates through party lists. 
This article tests whether MPs, who have different electoral and parliamentary 
experience, indeed show differences in representing local issues in parliament. The degree of 
local orientation is measured by the number of constituency-related written questions. 
Hungary is a convenient choice to model those behavioural traits that are closely connected to 
system characteristics because the Hungarian electoral system creates three different mandate 
  
types and it also allows for multiple candidacies and a considerable variation in terms of SMD 
experience. 
The article first reviews the literature on constituency service in parliament which is 
followed by the formulation of the hypotheses. Next, the Hungarian case is introduced with a 
special focus on the institutional context. Then it goes on to discuss the data and the 
operationalization of the variables. This is followed by an empirical test of the hypotheses. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and opens up new perspectives for future 
research. 
 
Constituency service in parliament 
 Scholars of legislative behaviour study different activities, apply diverse methods, and focus 
on a broad variety of explanatory factors. However, the majority of authors take Mayhew’s 
view as a starting point and consider legislators as ‘single-minded seekers of re-election’ 
(Mayhew, 1974). This leads to the assumption that most of the activities of the representatives 
can be attributed to their ambitions for re-election. 
Re-election may potentially be achieved through constituency orientation which would 
demonstrate to the local electorate that the MP cares about the district that he or she 
represents. There are several ways in which MPs can express local orientation to increase 
their chances for a personal vote. Most importantly, they engage in constituency service in the 
districts: they hold office hours, carry out ombudsman-like activities, and deal with local 
problems as well as respond to individual petitions (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Fenno, 
1978; Norris, 1997; Norton & Wood, 1990). However, MPs do not necessarily need to be 
present in their constituencies to show concern for local issues. As they spend most of their 
time in parliament, they need to differentiate themselves from other members there and 
demonstrate local orientation. The local relevance of bill initiation (Crisp & Ingall, 2002; 
Marangoni & Tronconi, 2011), membership in key committees (Manow, 2013; Stratmann & 
Baur, 2002), speeches (Hill & Hurley, 2002), parliamentary questioning (Martin, 2011) and 
the willingness to desert the party line at roll-call (Carey, 2007; Tavits, 2009) can reflect 
general concern about issues that are potentially important for the citizens of a particular 
location. 
Traditionally, parliamentary questioning is regarded as a mechanism of ex post government 
accountability in a sense that questions addressed to government members enable legislatures 
to control government actions. However, questions also bear ‘micro-functions’ in that they 
allow representatives to publicize personal achievements and bring up constituency-related 
  
issues (Bailer, 2011; Wiberg & Koura, 1994). In this respect, questioning serves as a tool of 
enhancing member visibility, and, indirectly, may yield votes at the next elections. As Russo 
and Wiberg put it, parliamentary questions ‘often have two dimensions, simultaneously acting 
as both a way to ask for information and a way to give information’ (Russo & Wiberg, 2010, 
p. 220). 
Martin (2011) argues that there are several advantages of investigating parliamentary 
questions compared to other methods of measuring personal vote-seeking. Because of its 
substantial direct and opportunity costs, questioning requires firm resource allocation 
strategies. Therefore, it also reveals representational priorities. Furthermore, despite the cross-
national variance in the strength of party control (Wiberg, 1995), written questions are less 
rigorously censored than roll-call behaviour, floor speeches and oral questions. Thus, they are 
more reliable indicators of individual strategies and preferences, not to mention the fact that 
questions offer direct, easily accessible measures without sampling bias (Martin, 2011). 
Hungarian House Rules allow four question types in parliament: interpellations, written 
and oral questions as well as direct ones. Floor time for interpellations, oral and direct 
questions are strictly limited. However, the number of written questions is not restricted. 
Thus, the Parliamentary Party Group (PPG) controls the submission of those questions that 
target the plenary session but written questions remain in the discretion of individual 
legislators to channel their personal preferences. Given the relatively weak party control of 
written questions, in this study they serve as a measure of member efforts to represent the 
local area in parliament. 
 
Mixed-member career incentives for local interest representation 
A considerable part of the personal vote literature ties constituency representation to electoral 
rules. The main argument is that the different rules represent different incentives for the 
pursuit of personalistic goals (Carey & Shugart, 1995). In contrast with countries where 
electoral rules strengthen the role of parties, systems that encourage the individual to emerge 
from the crowd of candidates generate higher level of personalization. Linking personal vote-
seeking to electoral rules, Carey and Shugart identified several components of the electoral 
system that may influence the incentives to perform constituency service (Carey & Shugart, 
1995; Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen, 2005). Electoral formula, ballot structure, district 
magnitude and candidate selection rules have all been demonstrated to structure member 
behaviour. 
  
The case of mixed-member electoral systems is particularly interesting for students of the 
electoral formula as it enables to test the effects of two (or more) different sets of rules within 
the same electoral and cultural context. The notion of mandate divide refers to the observation 
that due to the different incentives offered by the different tiers, the willingness of SMD and 
list MPs to engage in constituency service also differs. The electoral fortune of district 
members is tied to the geographical area they were elected in, while closed list members are 
held accountable by the party rather than the constituency. It has been shown that mandate 
type affects MP’s perceptions of pork barrel allocation (Lancaster & Patterson, 1990), and it 
makes a difference in how representatives perceive their roles (Klingemann & Wessels, 
2001). Ward (1998) reports that the media refers to list members as second class 
representatives in New-Zealand. Bowler and Farrell (1993) theorize that list MPs work less in 
their districts because they are able to ‘shirk’ the demand for constituency service, whereas in 
SMDs all demand concentrates on a single MP. 
Nevertheless, in systems that allow for multiple candidacies, party list representatives are 
often reported to be interested in working for the SMD they competed in. As a consequence, 
the difference between the constituency-orientation of SMD incumbents and list members will 
be less sharp compared to a mixed-member setup with no parallel nominations. For instance, 
in constituencies with a narrow electoral margin (marginal constituency), the second 
candidate might feel the need to act like the winner only because he or she wants to stay in 
competition for the next elections (Ingall & Crisp, 2001; Kumbhat & Marcian, 1976; Norris, 
2004; Norris, Vallance, & Lovenduski, 1992; Soroka, Penner, & Blidook, 2009; Zittel, 2012). 
Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that even in non-marginal districts list MPs who 
previously ran for the SMDs often appear as the ‘shadows’ of SMD members, and set up local 
offices (Carman & Shephard, 2007) as well as engage in constituency service just like SMD 
MPs. 
Based on the above, mixed-member systems permitting multiple candidacies lead to the 
emergence of at least three types of representatives. First tier MPs are bound to their 
constituencies through their offices. They are held accountable by the voters for their actions, 
as it is clear who to punish or reward if the district magnitude is low (Cain et al., 1987; Norris, 
2004; Scholl, 1986). Assuming that SMD members prefer to be re-elected as SMD MPs over 
being elected from the party lists at the next elections, they seek to collect personal vote and 
engage in constituency oriented activities. The second type of MPs are those representatives 
who were running as SMD candidates, but were elected from party lists. Based solely on 
mandate type, these MPs should not be motivated to make extra effort to represent the local 
  
area. However, SMD candidacy reflects their intention to become players on the lowest level 
of the electoral system, which is an incentive to pick up additional activities, like standing for 
local issues in parliament. Nevertheless, their willingness to do so will be less strong than the 
SMD members’ calling to constituency service. The reason for this is that whereas at the next 
elections they cannot be held accountable by the voters for what happens in the district, SMD 
members suffer the direct consequences of being unsuccessful in local interest representation 
by losing their office as SMD MPs. The third group of MPs consists of legislators who were 
elected from party lists and were not nominated as first tier candidates. Members of this group 
have no office-driven or candidacy-related motivations to engage into extra activities to raise 
personal vote. They are not tied to the local level through their offices, nor do they enter the 
SMD-level competition. Thus, the following hypotheses describe the differences between the 
three types of MPs with regards to the degree of local orientation in parliament. 
 
(H1) SMD MPs submit a larger number of locally relevant questions than list representatives 
who were also nominated in SMDs. 
(H2) SMD MPs submit a larger number of locally relevant questions than list representatives 
who were not nominated in SMDs. 
(H3) List MPs who were nominated in SMDs submit a larger number of locally relevant 
questions than list representatives who were not nominated on the first tier. 
 
The first two hypotheses test whether there is a divide between SMD and party list MPs. 
Confirming both H1 and H2 would support the mandate divide, while rejecting either of them 
would suggest that SMD members do not necessarily outweigh list representatives in terms of 
locally oriented parliamentary questioning. Similarly, evidence that support H2 and H3 also 
underpins the ‘shadowing’ theory that implies that SMD candidates are more likely to be 
locally oriented than those who were not nominated in SMDs. However, if one of these 
hypotheses is not confirmed, the ‘shadowing’ theory would lack sufficient empirical support. 
A simple consequence of mixed-member electoral rules is that MPs elected on the different 
tiers might have experiences on other levels, too. For example, a party list representative who 
serves his or her fifth term may as well be a four-time SMD member who lost the seat due to 
bad electoral fortune. Yet, the literature discussing the relationship between former legislative 
experience and parliamentary activities in mixed-member systems does not offer many 
guidelines in this respect. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to argue that election 
inconsistency significantly affects how members behave. First, past SMD experience 
  
indicates that the given member has an established connection with the district, which may 
lead to the emergence of intrinsic motivations of carrying out constituency service. If we 
accept that representational roles are learned roles rather than rational strategies (see Zittel, 
2012), then varying personal election history may also affect how members act in the interests 
of their former constituencies. Those who have substantial experience in representing the 
local level might be more active in locally oriented questioning regardless of what positions 
they currently fill in the parliament simply because doing so became more of a habit for them 
rather than a rational, vote-seeking consideration. Second, even if one does not account for the 
possibility that member activities are driven by such intrinsic motivations, election history 
may still play a role in determining constituency-orientation. Manow (2013) argues that in 
order to map the full range of motivations we should consider the different ways in which 
MPs enter the legislature because this may also reveal future election preferences. Although 
Manow discusses candidacy on the various levels of the German electoral system, it is 
plausible to expect that overall legislative experience affects future ambitions in other 
contexts, too. This is especially relevant in the case of former SMD representatives who have 
a longer history of serving as first tier MPs. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis states that (H4) 
the longer the SMD-level legislative experience, the larger the number of locally relevant 
questions. 
In order to be able to establish the connection between system-related career factors and 
questioning behaviour in parliament, electoral rules should comply with several criteria. First, 
MPs have to be elected from multiple tiers. Second, candidacy on more than one tier should 
also be permitted. Third it is essential that MPs have varying experience on the SMD-level. 
The next section demonstrates that the Hungarian electoral system bears all the above features 
thus it is a convenient choice to test the hypothesis. 
 
The Hungarian case 
Until the change of the electoral law in 2011, Hungary had a three-tier mixed member 
electoral system with partial compensation (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). 176 
representatives were elected from single member districts (first tier) under the rules of 
absolute majority in the first, and relative majority in the second round of election. A further 
146 legislators gained their mandate from 20 multi-member constituencies (second tier) of 
which territories aligned with the 19 counties and the capital city of Budapest. Lastly, 64 MPs 
began their service as national list representatives (third tier) by utilizing the surplus votes 
  
from the first two tiers. Members from both the second and third tiers were elected from 
closed party lists. 
An important feature of the Hungarian electoral system is that candidates have been 
allowed to be nominated on multiple tiers simultaneously. About 40 percent of candidates 
between 1990 and 2010 ran on at least two tiers of the system. In 2010, 45 percent of list MPs 
were nominated in SMDs. In addition, there was also a substantial variation with regards to 
SMD experience because 37 percent of legislators elected in 2010 gained SMD mandates in 
the past, among which 60 percent held either regional or national list mandates in 2010. 
 
Data and variables 
The article analyzes questions submitted for written response to the Hungarian Parliament 
between May 2010 and January 2013. Only individual questions entered the dataset, multi-
authored ones were not taken into account. The sample thus consists of 4,145 questions. 
Constituency-orientation is defined in three distinct ways. First, undefined localism refers to 
localism in the broadest possible sense: did the questioning MP mention any local area or 
issue irrespective of whether he or she is connected to that local area through mandate or 
candidacy?. In this respect, issues that concern a particular geographical area smaller than the 
whole country are considered local. Second, county-related localism refers to the county in 
which the MP was either elected on the first or the second tier, or nominated as an SMD 
candidate. In this case, questions that relate to the county where the questioning MP was 
holding a mandate (SMD or regional list) or was nominated as an SMD candidate were coded 
as local. Third, constituency-related localism relates to the constituency of election. 
Consequently, only first and second tier members are included for whom the single member 
district and the county serve as constituency. Thus, the definition of the constituency varies 
with mandate type: it is the SMD for SMD members and the county for regional list 
representatives. After determining whether the different questions touch upon undefined, 
county and/or constituency-related local issues
1
, the data was aggregated in a way that the 
                                                          
1
 Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive. One question can be considered local along all three 
types of localism defined in the paper. For example, for and SMD MP, a question related to his or her 
constituency will be coded as local not only in the category of constituency-related localism, but in the other two 
as well. Also, questions cannot be coded without the context, which is in this case the questioning MP’s electoral 
information. In the course of creating the research design, up to 50 questions were coded by multiple researchers 
(including the author) to assess how complicated the coding can become. During this trial period we simplified 
the codebook up to a point where all senior researchers agreed that it is straightforward enough to work with one 
  
related dependent variables measure the number of local questions submitted by the given 
MP. 
As for the independent variables
2
, two indicators test the effects of those career factors on 
local orientation that are directly related to electoral rules. First, SMD positions distinguishes 
among mandate types by introducing a category for (1) SMD members, (2) list representatives 
running in SMDs in 2010, and (3) list MPs not nominated on the first tier. Second, SMD 
experience entails the number of past electoral terms served as an SMD representative. 
To estimate the net effect of the above factors on the number of locally relevant written 
questions one has to control for additional variables. First, regardless of the ballot structure 
the incentive to free-ride increases with district magnitude (Cain et al., 1987; Norris, 2004; 
Scholl, 1986). Seddon et al. show that small constituencies ‘increase the needs for legislators 
to internalize the consequences of redistributive policies’ (Seddon, Gaviria, Panizza, & Stein, 
2002, p. 14), which makes them more willing to represent the direct interests of the district in 
the legislature. Others argue that the higher the number of MPs representing a constituency, 
the less likely that each individual representative will be able to claim credit for those 
resources that the given district receives from the state. In other words, pork barrel politics is 
a less effective vote-attractor if the district magnitude is high (Lancaster, 1986). This 
especially applies to the case of closed list systems, where the rank of candidates on the party 
lists is pre-determined by the party (Shugart et al., 2005). If, as in Hungary, party lists are 
closed, then legislators elected in counties with larger magnitude are expected to submit a 
smaller number of locally oriented written questions. 
There are two ways to measure the local embeddedness of an MP: local political positions 
and place of birth. With regards to the period under investigation, Hungarian electoral rules 
permitted multiple-office holding: MPs were allowed to run for positions in local 
governments. As voters seek to elect candidates who are familiar with the peculiarities of the 
local area (Putnam, 1976; Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 2010), holding multiple offices may 
serve as an important asset during election time. However, when elected, representatives 
might pursue different agendas and focus on issues that are related to their local areas (Russo, 
2011), thus submit a larger number of local questions. Second, place of birth might also affect 
how representatives bring local issues to the parliament. Having been born in the constituency 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
coder per question. Questions were coded manually by two MA-students using the electoral information on the 
questioning representatives. The progress of the coders was closely monitored. Questions that appeared to be 
more difficult to code were discussed among the coders and the author, 
2
 For a complete list of independent variables and descriptive statistics see Appendix 1. 
  
strengthens the connection between the MPs and their electoral districts. Legislators are 
expected to ask more local questions if they represent districts where they were born. 
Furthermore, seniority also plays an important role in constituency service. Based on 
Norton and Wood’s intra-generational hypothesis, newcomers to the Parliament are more 
constituency-oriented because they still need to build up their local voter base (Norton & 
Wood, 1990). This hypotheses (also formulated by Fenno (1978)), however, is drawn from 
the logic of pure SMD systems. Under closed list Proportional Representation (PR) rules, 
candidates have to secure the party’s support instead of the voters’ (Heitshusen et al., 2005). 
Due to rather centralized candidate selection on the SMD tier and the role of the closed party 
lists in the Hungarian electoral system, newcomers are expected to be more constituency-
oriented, and ask a larger number of local questions. 
Wahlke et al. (1962) argue that the parties play an important role in the socialization of 
legislators. Those who climbed the ‘corporate ladder’ to reach high positions in their party 
acquired attitudes that direct the individual’s focus of representation to the party (Zittel, 2012) 
instead of the constituency. Thus, party leaders are expected to be less concerned about local 
issues in parliament. Additionally, they also have less time to engage in constituency service 
compared to backbench representatives. The same reasoning applies to the case of MPs with 
leadership roles in parliament. The positions of the speaker, vice-presidents, leaders of the 
PPG and committee chairs require a lot of time and resources that prevent legislators from 
focusing on particular local problems. Therefore, MPs serving in any of the above positions in 
parliament are likely to produce fewer local questions. 
Traditionally, parliamentary questions are considered as tools for ex post government 
control. Therefore, it is expected that government MPs tend to ask fewer questions than 
representatives of the opposition. Assuming that the localness of the questions is distributed 
evenly among the two groups of MPs, opposition MPs should submit a larger amount of local 
questions. 
Last, but not least, electoral margin also plays a substantial role in explaining member 
efforts. It is theorized that the narrower the electoral margin, the more representatives are 
encouraged to carry out constituency service (Ingall & Crisp, 2001). A fierce competition in 
the constituency makes electoral outcomes dependent on the candidates’ ability to attract 
personal vote. Thus, compared to safe districts, uncertain electoral results increase the 
willingness to engage in constituency-centred activities. 
 
Results 
  
The dependent variables of this analysis measure counts: the number of local questions 
submitted by the given MP. The variance largely exceeds the mean
3
 (over-dispersion) in the 
case of all three dependent variables. The most commonly used tool to model over-dispersed 
count variables is the negative binomial regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997). 
Table 1 shows the results from the models explaining the number of local (undefined) and 
constituency-related questions. Entries are incidence rate ratios (IRR), which means that 
values greater than 1 indicate positive effects, while coefficients that are smaller than 1 
represent a negative connection between the related independent and dependent variables 
As for the factors that are not directly related to the hypotheses of the analysis, only the 
party seems to play a role in the frequency with which Hungarian MPs submit local questions. 
Taking questions with any local relevance into account (Model 1 in Table 1), opposition MPs, 
on average, pose more of them than their government peers. This also implies that the local 
representation function of written questions is closely related to government scrutiny. Not 
only do opposition MPs submit more questions to scrutinize the government, but they 
outweigh government parties with regards to the extent of local questioning as well. As the 
effect of being related to any particular local area is already controlled for (SMD positions, 
SMD experience and local political positions), the effect of political sides are not necessarily 
related to the MPs personal involvement (i.e. direct ties to the constituency) in representing 
local interests. It is more likely that opposition MPs who submit written questions aim to exert 
government control but they frame their inquiry as a locally relevant question. Nevertheless, 
being a government MP does not have any significant effect on the extent of local orientation 
in the case of those questions that have a more specific local content (i.e. relate to a more 
strictly defined local area; see Model 2 in Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Turning to the effects of variables that are related to the mixed-member system design, 
both SMD positions and SMD experience are significant (see Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 
1). It was expected that SMD representatives do more for their local areas than list MPs 
because the local electorate may hold them responsible for the well-being of the district. Thus 
they need to advertise their work as the district’s elected legislators in order to establish the 
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 Undefined localism: Mean = 1.98, Variance = 52.7, Constituency related localism: Mean = 1.44, Variance = 
38.5, County related localism: Mean = 1.45, Variance = 38.9 
  
accountability linkage. However, the results contradict this basic intuition: list representatives 
who were running in SMDs at the preceding election ask more locally oriented questions than 
SMD MPs. Furthermore, list MPs who were not nominated in SMDs bring fewer local 
questions to the agenda than constituency members. 
The strong effect of SMD candidacy reveals how losing candidates perceive their roles as 
representatives
4
. These MPs need to find ways to ‘shadow’ their competitors and drafting 
written questions is a relatively costless way to do so. Moreover, the submission of written 
questions also reveals that they are willing to invest at least a part of their resources into 
pursuing goals that are not directly related to their current status in parliament
5
. 
Turning to the effect of SMD experience (H4), a natural consequence of mixed member 
rules is that it offers members an extended set of opportunities to get elected. In certain cases 
this leads to a career of discontinuity in terms of the kind of mandates the MPs hold 
throughout their careers. Changing political fortunes may leave experienced SMD MPs in list 
positions and bring multiple-term list representatives to take over the SMD seats. The models 
presented in Table 1 support the fourth hypothesis and suggest that MPs with a longer history 
of constituency representation submit more locally targeted written questions. 
                                                          
4
 Data from the first round of the Comparative Candidates Survey support the results with regards to the role 
perceptions of SMD candidates. 230 MPs were surveyed in 2010. 51.5 percent of SMD candidates claimed that 
representing their constituencies is the most important task they undertake as Members of Parliament. In 
comparison, only 23.4 % of legislators who were not nominated on the first tier chose the constituency 
(Cramer’s V = .253***). 
5
 It has to be mentioned that the 2010 elections established a unique situation in the Hungarian parliament. 
Fidesz and KDNP (the government parties) were able to secure two-third of the seats because they were 
extremely successful in the first tier competition. Consequently, list legislators who did run in SMDs are almost 
exclusively opposition MPs. This aspect does not seem to cause any problems in the model in terms of inflating 
the standard errors too much (VIF<4). Especially as in Model 1, both variables have significant effects. In Model 
2, government MPs have a larger coefficient than in Model 1, but the standard error grew in a more substantial 
manner. The main question here is that whether the effect of being a government MPs is incorporated in the 
effect of SMD positions. Based on the logic of multivariate analysis, coefficients display net effects. This means, 
that the effects of the individual variables are interpreted as if everything else would remain unchanged. 
However, one should be careful with the interpretation of such data. In Model 2 (Table 1), the coefficient for list 
MPs who ran in SMDs is 6.67 (SE=5.05). In a model that does not control for government MPs, the same 
coefficient would be 9.45 (SE=5.19). Thus, SMD positions explain a great deal, and including the control 
variable for government MPs only changes its effect to some extent. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we do 
not have to be careful when drawing the conclusions from these results. One would need to extend the analysis 
to additional electoral terms to entirely separate the effects of these two variables. 
  
To test whether the strong effect of SMD experience is consistent over groups of MPs with 
different SMD positions, interaction terms were introduced (Table 2) into the models 
presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The results of Model 3 highlight that although experience has an overall positive effect on 
the number of local questions, in the case of undefined localism the magnitude of its effect is 
conditional upon mandate type and candidacy. The interaction between SMD positions and 
SMD experience reveals that in the case of list MPs, the number of formerly held SMD 
mandates slightly decrease the frequency of submitting locally relevant questions (see dashed 
and dotted lines in Figure 1). This indicates that SMD experience does not overwrite 
incentives created by current positions (i.e. by being a party list MP): list MPs will not submit 
more questions just because they have extensive SMD level experience. A stronger effect is 
associated with SMD experience within the group of SMD MPs. The longer they serve in the 
single member districts, the more locally oriented they appear (see solid line in Figure 1). This 
suggests that more experienced SMD legislators value the power of parliamentary questioning 
which serves for them as a means of interest representation and advertising their 
achievements. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In relation to SMD candidates and their constituency oriented behaviour, it is often suggested 
that marginality plays an important role in determining whether SMD candidates decide to 
strengthen their positions within the SMDs. In constituencies where competition is fierce, 
both winners and losers are encouraged to work hard to either keep or take over the district. In 
safe constituencies, however, incentives to work hard will be considerably lower for all 
competitors. Table 3 shows the results of the negative binomial regressions estimating the 
number of questions that are related to the county
6
 of nomination in the case of SMD 
                                                          
6
 The data does not allow matching list members with the SMDs they were nominated in. Information is 
available only on whether they touched upon issues related to the county where the SMD is located in. For the 
sake of consistency, county-related localism is taken into account in the case of SMD members as well. 
However, it should be noted, that in the latter case constituency- and county-related localism are in perfect 
correspondence. 
  
candidates. Although electoral margin matters, the effect does not point to the expected 
direction in Model 5. On the contrary, localness intensifies with an increasing margin. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The interaction term in Model 6 that controls for the difference in the effect of the electoral 
margin in the cases of winners and losers is not statistically significant. This means that the 
effect of margin does not vary between MPs with different SMD positions. Not only do losers 
work harder when the electoral margin increases, but also winners make more effort when 
their seat appears to be safer. Safe seats represent great prestige in Hungary for both the 
incumbent and the party. These districts are also the most important to keep, as a defeat in a 
safe constituency transmits a quite negative message to the voters of the party. Thus, 
incumbent MPs are motivated to work harder in these SMDs to make sure that nobody would 
threaten their position in the electorate. Similarly, for the challenger, it is crucial to perform 
better in these constituencies. Breaking the dominance of the incumbent or just narrowing the 
popularity gap increases political strength. Furthermore, as the votes for the losers pool to the 
national list tier and add to party votes, vote maximizing SMD candidates can contribute to 
party success even if they do not stand a chance in their constituencies as individual 
candidates. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The final step in testing the effect of SMD positions on the local orientation of parliamentary 
questioning is to control for the number of MPs representing the same geographical area 
(district magnitude). To do this, county-related questions have to be taken into account. 
District magnitude in this case shows the number of legislators elected in the same county, 
first and second tier mandates included. It is assumed that the larger the number of MPs 
representing the same district, the more they are able to ‘shirk’ the demand for constituency 
service thus the smaller the number of county-related questions. However, results of Model 7 
(Table 4) do not seem to support this assumption: district magnitude is not associated with 
local orientation. Nevertheless, the interaction term in Model 8 suggests that district size 
interferes with how SMD positions affect the number of county-related questions. Figure 2 
visualizes the interaction between SMD positions and county-level district magnitude. The 
  
solid line reveals that the growing number of MPs hardly influences the county-related 
localness of SMD members. The difference between small and large counties manifests in 
different intensities of localism only in the case of regional list MPs who were also running 
for SMD seats. 
Regional list representatives give more effort in districts with fewer legislators, but if 
district magnitude grows, the number of written questions declines. More importantly, in large 
counties, the differences between the different types of MPs seem to fade. Whereas the 
difference in local questioning is considerable in smaller counties, with increasing district 
magnitude the number of county-related questions rapidly converges to the level of SMD MPs 
and list members who were not nominated on the first tier. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
One of the main conclusions of the above analysis is that written questioning seems to be the 
losers’ tool for constituency service: less successful parties and candidates channel 
government scrutiny and constituency orientation through written questions. However, 
localism serves as a tool of government control only if questions touch upon local issues that 
are not directly related to the area of election or candidacy of the MP who submits the 
question. This means that questions without any relevance for the questioning MP’s 
background also serve scrutiny functions. Nevertheless, with a more direct relationship 
between the MP and the area to which the questions are related, the scrutinizing function 
becomes less clear. It indicates that this particular form of questioning can be considered an 
existing tool of getting across local messages in Hungary. In this sense, the dependent 
variables of this analysis measured local orientation independently from other functions of 
parliamentary questioning (e.g. government scrutiny). 
The analysis supports the hypothesis suggesting that SMD MPs submit a larger number of 
locally relevant questions than list representatives who were not nominated in SMDs. 
Furthermore, SMD candidacy makes a difference within the group of list MPs as well: list 
MPs nominated in SMDs are significantly more active in local questioning than list MPs who 
were not running in SMDs. However, list members with SMD candidacy are more active than 
SMD MPs in terms of submitting locally relevant questions. This leads to the rejection of H1 
which stated the opposite. This finding also indicates that the mandate divide does not 
structure the questioning behaviour of Hungarian MPs. The local orientation of SMD 
  
representatives is prevalent only if we compare them with list MPs who were not competing 
on the first tier. In spite of a more clear-cut accountability linkage, SMD winners do not put 
extra effort in representing their constituencies through written questions. SMD candidacy 
appears to be a better predictor of questioning efforts. 
However, analysing only one aspect of constituency service is not sufficient to conclude 
that the mandate divide does not prevail in Hungary at all. The reason why it is difficult to 
find robust relationships between certain types of activities and the explanatory factors is that 
MPs maintain different portfolios when it comes to constituency representation (André & 
Depauw, 2013). It is certainly more plausible to argue that for SMD MPs written questioning 
is not considered as an important part of this portfolio. It also involves that these results 
highlight the practice of parliamentary questioning and less so the mandate divide itself. 
Written questions are part of a portfolio of activities used to express local concern in the case 
of those who lost in the SMDs. Due to its unrestricted availability, written questions are 
convenient tools for members who cannot step up as SMD representatives. Shadowing 
becomes stronger in non-marginal constituencies, which shows the great political value of the 
single member districts in Hungarian politics. Even MPs with modest chances of winning the 
district engage in locally oriented parliamentary questioning to increase the party vote and 
demonstrate their own capability. 
It was also expected that past SMD experience is positively related to constituency-
orientation in parliament. Indeed, more experienced MPs asked more locally oriented 
questions. Interestingly, legislative career paths influence the relationship between mandate 
type and the local focus of the questions as well. SMD MPs become more active with 
increasing experience, while in the case of list members, a more articulate SMD past does not 
coincide with a larger number of local questions. This indicates that career inconsistencies 
(i.e. serving as a list member with considerable SMD experience) do not influence behaviour 
in parliament, but rather consistencies (i.e. being an experienced SMD member) are the key 
factors in assessing the effect of former experience.  
The above analysis highlights that system-specific electoral factors matter in locally 
oriented written questioning. In fact, they appear more important than factors that are 
independent from electoral rules. However, it also underlines the circumstantial character of 
the mandate divide. The most common conception with regards to mixed-member electoral 
rules is that SMD members are more locally conscious than party list MPs. Although one 
cannot reject this hypothesis on the basis of the above analysis, the results demonstrate that 
different types of MPs might perceive the usefulness of different types of activities in various 
  
ways. Written questioning in the Hungarian parliament is perceived as a useful tool by SMD 
candidates who shadow their elected colleagues. Furthermore, the relatively low goodness-of-
fit measures of the models suggest that much of the variance remains unexplained. Future 
research might benefit from extending the analysis to multiple electoral terms as well as 
taking different tools of local representation into account to cover a full portfolio of member 
activities aiming at local representation. 
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Table 1: Negative binomial regression models explaining the number of locally relevant 
questions 
Variables Model 1 
All MPs 
Undefined localism 
Model 2 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 tier MPs 
Constituency related localism 
SMD positions
a
   
List MP & SMD candidate 2.86 (1.48)** 6.67 (5.05)** 
List MP & not SMD candidate .39 (.18)** .25 (.14)** 
SMD experience 1.55 (.26)** 1.77 (.38)*** 
Local political position .85 (.26) 1.09 (.47) 
Place of birth  1.13 (.46) 
New MP .69 (.24) .61 (.29) 
Party leader 1.36 (.44) 1.51 (.68) 
Position in parliament 1.44 (.67) .54 (.40) 
Government MP .30 (.12)*** .65 (.41) 
Intercept 1.83 (1.08) .58 (.48) 
Pseudo R
2  
(Nagelkerke) 0.185 0.183 
LL Intercept only model -538.93 -342.33 
LL Full model -501.03 -313.72 
N 401 326 
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1 
Entries are incidence rate ratios (IRR) with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dispersion parameter alpha is different from zero in all of the reported models (p<.01). 
a Control variable: SMD MP 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 2: Negative binomial regression models explaining the number of locally relevant 
questions with interactions (SMD experience*SMD positions) 
Variables Model 3 
All MPs 
Undefined localism 
Model 4 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 tier MPs 
Constituency related localism 
SMD positions
a
   
List MP & SMD candidate 5.08 (2.81)*** 10.69 (8.69)*** 
List MP & not SMD candidate .59 (.27) .36 (.20)* 
SMD experience 1.95 (.37)*** 2.06 (.48)*** 
SMD experience*List MP& SMD 
candidate (interaction term) 
.46 (.15)** .47 (.23) 
SMD experience*List MP & not SMD 
candidate (interaction term) 
.33 (.14)** .00 (.00) 
Local political position 1.07 (.35) 1.26 (.56) 
Place of birth  1.22 (.49) 
New MP .65 (.22) .57 (.26) 
Party leader 1.21 (.38) 1.31 (.60) 
Position in parliament 1.51 (.71) .54 (.41) 
Government MP .26 (.10)*** .56 (.38) 
Intercept 1.40 (.82) .53 (.44) 
Pseudo R
2  
(Nagelkerke) 0.203 0.201 
LL Intercept only model -538.23 -342.33 
LL Full model -496.83 -310.65 
N 401 326 
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1 
Entries are incidence rate ratios (IRR) with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The dispersion parameter alpha is different from zero in all of the reported models (p<.01). 
a Control variable: SMD MP 
 
 
  
  
Table 3: Negative binomial regression models explaining county related localism in 
relation with the county of nomination (SMD candidates only) 
Variables Model 5 Model 6 
SMD Winner .04 (.04)*** .04 (.04)*** 
Electoral  margin (centred) 89.63 (118.55)*** 41.81 (70.31)** 
SMD Winner*Electoral margin (centred)  4.41 (12.33) 
SMD experience 1.32 (.29) 1.27 (.26) 
Local political position 1.09 (.41) 1.13 (.41) 
New MP .39 (.19)* .37 (.18)** 
Party leader 1.96 (.67)* 1.92 (.64)* 
Position in parliament .57 (.32) .55 (.32) 
Government MP 4.29 (4.06) 4.01 (3.91) 
Intercept 3.06 (1.39)** 3.16 (1.43) 
Pseudo (Nagelkerke) R
2
 0.16 0.16 
LL Intercept only model -377.47 -377.47 
LL Full model -354.53 -354.42 
N 275 275 
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1 
Entries are incidence rate ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by SMD 
(176 clusters were created). 
The dispersion parameter alpha is different from zero in all of the reported models (p<.01). 
 
 
  
  
Table 4: Negative binomial regression models explaining county related localism in 
relation with the county of election (SMD and regional list MPs only) 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 
SMD positions
a
   
List MP & SMD candidate 6.25 (4.58)** 5.11 (3.48)** 
List MP & not SMD candidate .24 (.10)** .25 (.11)** 
District magnitude (logged and centred) .84 (.19) 1.21 (.38) 
District magnitude * List MP & SMD candidate  .14 (.06)*** 
District magnitude * List MP & not SMD candidate  .68 (.38) 
Place of birth 1.21 (.36) 1.05 (.30) 
SMD experience 1.75 (.49)** 1.74 (.48)** 
Local political position 1.09 (.33) 1.08 (.33) 
New MP .59 (.23) .61 (.24) 
Party leader 1.48 (.48) 1.17 (.39) 
Position in parliament .56 (.18)* .65 (.20) 
Government MP .64 (.42) .55 (.33) 
Intercept .60 (.46) .75 (.54) 
Pseudo (Nagelkerke) R
2
 0.188 0.201 
LL Intercept only model -344.97 -344.97 
LL Full model -315.56 -313.23 
N 326 326 
***p< .01, **p< .05, *p< .1 
Entries are incidence rate ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by 
county (20 clusters were created). 
The dispersion parameter alpha is different from zero in all of the reported models (p<.01). 
a Control variable: SMD MP 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1: The interconnectedness of former SMD experience and SMD positions in 
explaining undefined localism (marginal effects) 
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Figure 2: The interconnectedness of district size and SMD positions in explaining 
county-related localism (marginal effects) 
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Appendix 1. List of variables in the analysis 
Variables Variable coding Number 
(Percent) 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Undefined 
localism 
The number of questions mentioning any local issue  1.98 (7.26) 
County related 
localism 
The number of questions mentioning county related 
issues 
 1.2 (5.72) 
Constituency 
related localism 
The number of questions mentioning constituency 
related issues 
 1.2 (5.69) 
SMD positions 1 = SMD MP 179 (44.6)  
 2 = List MP & SMD candidate 100 (25.0)  
 3 = List MP & Not an SMD candidate 122 (30.4)  
SMD experience The number of terms served as an SMD representative 
excluding the current term 
 .61 (1.07) 
District 
magnitude 
The number of seats available in a given county 
including SMD and list positions 
 24.4 (18.13) 
Local political 
positions 
0 = No local political position 218 (54.4)  
 1 = Mayor and/or member of the local council 183 (45.6)  
Place of birth 0 = Born outside the electoral district 237 (49.7)  
 1 = Born within the electoral district 164 (50.3)  
New MP 0 = Senior legislator 213 (53.2)  
 1 = New MP 188 (46.8)  
Party leader 0 = Not a national party leader 262 (65.4)  
 1 = National party leader 139 (34.6)  
Position in 
parliament 
0 = No parliamentary and committee leadership 
position 
362 (90.3)  
 1 = Fills in parliament leadership position and/or 
committee chair 
39 (9.7)  
Government MP 0 = Opposition MP 128 (31.9)  
 1 = Government MP 273 (68.1)  
Electoral margin Vote difference between the SMD winner and the 
second place candidate divided by the number of valid 
votes cast in the given constituency 
 .29 (.12) 
 
